I. Introduction
During the Cold War, the United States used the threat of Communism to legitimize its intervention in countries in which the emergence of opposition groups upset the balance of power. The labeling of these groups as communist and consequently the linkage of these groups to the Soviet Union allowed the U.S. to intervene on the grounds of protecting American security and containing the Soviet Union from totalitarian expansion. Furthermore, the U.S. was able to gain both domestic and international public support for its interventions against communist groups through the use of propaganda. American newspapers and other media sold the threat of Communism and the need for American intervention against such a threat to protect national and global security.
Today, the United States has intervened in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan that either support or harbor opposition groups, but instead of Communism, these groups have been labeled as Islamic extremists. While communist opposition groups were linked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Islamic extremist groups are most generally linked to Al-Qaeda which became a threat after their attacks against the U.S. on September 11. As a result of the attacks, the U.S. has formulated a global war on terror, linking Islamic fundamentalists to terrorism, consequently making them an international security threat. Thus, is the United States once again using ideological propaganda to legitimize its interventions in the Middle East? Furthermore, is Islamic fundamentalism as much of a threat to national and global security today as Communism was during the Cold War? This paper argues that the U.S. has continued to sell the threat of ideological differences through newspapers and other media to legitimize American intervention as a means for protecting national interests and security and also preserving a global balance of power. However, given that the U.S. maintains friendly relations with countries that have Muslim majorities and members of Islamic extremist groups, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is not as legitimate as American media makes it seem.
II. Literature Review
With its announcement of the global war on terror, the U.S. has targeted Islamic extremist groups as the primary threat to the American and global security, consequently requiring a need to proactively dismantle these groups. Given the role that ideological differences play between the U.S. and Islamic fundamentalist groups, studies have frequently made comparisons to the threat of conflicting ideologies that existed during the Cold War which support the hypothesis of this paper that the U.S. is once again using a Cold War strategy of promoting ideological differences to legitimize foreign intervention. James Kurth, for example, indicates that there are three common elements between the global Islamist threat and the global communist threat including the threat of Islamic and communist insurgents, the threat of transnational networks of Islamic and communist groups and the threat of neighboring countries with nuclear weapons – Iran and Southeast Asia respectively.[1] Kurth concludes that one of the most effective strategies was to use communist states to contain each other. He then applies this strategy to the Iraq war and Islamic extremism suggesting that the U.S. should combat this new ideology by separating moderate adherents from extremist adherents, Sunni Muslims from Shiites and Muslim militias from Islamic terrorists.[2] Although Kurth uses this comparative analysis to develop a strategy against the ideological threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Iraq War, his findings also revealed that in both the Cold War and the Iraq War, the U.S. formulated its foreign policy and strategies of intervention to combat these ideological threats.
In another study, Paul Paolucci examines the role of mass media as a means to legitimize U.S. intervention in Iraq, explaining that the U.S. executives and newspapers often omitted or provided false information in its reports on American policy in Iraq and came to frame the war as one against Islamic fundamentalism.[3] Paolucci notes that the American government had to oversell the Iraqi threat in order to legitimize its intervention and did so by publicly linking Saddam to Islamic extremist groups like Al-Qaeda only strengthening the American fear of Islamic fundamentalists.[4] Kenneth Weinstein also explains that after September 11 the United States had a few foreign policy options including destroying Al-Qaeda, thus leaving the Taliban in place in Afghanistan, or targeting ‘Islamic Jidhadism,’ both secular and religious collectively.[5] Weinstein concludes that the U.S. chose to promote the broader policy of proactively dismantling Islamic extremist groups all together by implementing democratic regimes.[6]
These studies all reveal that the United States based its foreign policy on the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, just as the U.S. created a strategy during the Cold War aimed towards the threat of Communism to justify the need for intervention.
Other studies examining the role that competing ideologies played during both the Cold War and the wars in the Middle East have looked to question whether or not ideological differences are really the core of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Christopher Hobson, for example, argues that the reasoning behind the American intervention in Iraq has nothing to do with resolving ideological differences by installing democratic regimes to remove Islamic extremism, but rather is only based on pursuing American self-interest.[7] He explains that the United States has consistently put its own national interests before its efforts to bring about democracy as seen in many cases including Venezuela, Turkey and Australia and thus the intervention in Iraq can be no different.[8] Similarly, George Leaman agrees that the American invasion of Iraq is not based on strategies aimed towards ending the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism but rather is based on an effort to secure the continuation of American military and economic supremacy on a global scale.[9] Leaman explains that just as the U.S. manipulated the Communist threat of the Soviet Union for domestic political purposes, so too did the U.S. manipulate the threat of Islamic terrorism for national interest.[10] Juan Cole also stresses the fact that the U.S. has once again exaggerated the threat of the Muslim World based on the linkages made between Islam and terrorism, similar to the way that the U.S. exaggerated the threat of rising communist regimes during the Cold War.[11] Cole points to the peaceful relations between the United States and allied countries with a majority Muslim population including Turkey, Egypt and Jordan to explain that it is not the different ideology that poses a threat, even though some Muslim extremist groups are a threat; thus the U.S. must stop implying that Muslim nations in general are more dangerous than others.[12] Finally the Congressional Quarterly also concludes that after September 11, President Bush’s administration used the global war on terror to legitimize and sell the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq when in reality the administration had looked to install democratic regimes in Iraq before the events of September 11 took place.[13] Thus these studies all point out that the U.S. government looked to use ideological differences as a means to legitimize the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq when in reality there existed alternative strategies and incentives. The studies used different data including friendly relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries, American support of non-democratic regimes in other countries and historical uses of ideological propaganda by the U.S., specifically during the Cold War, to reveal that Islamic fundamentalism does not pose as much of a threat to American and global security as the U.S. suggests it does.
III. Methodology
In order to test my hypothesis that the U.S. used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to legitimize its intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, just as it used the threat of Communism during the Cold War to legitimize intervention and proxy wars in countries with communist opposition groups, I will be looking mainly at newspaper articles and public speeches given by the President to see how the United States promoted the war on terror and threat of Communist and Islamic ideology. I will be looking at media during the Cold War, the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq drawing similarities in American propaganda to highlight how in both periods, the U.S. highlighted the threat of Communism and Islamic fundamentalism in order to gain domestic and international support and provide sensible cause for intervening in foreign territories. Although September 11 is not a period of American intervention, I will be looking at media around that time to see how the U.S. initially framed the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. However some of the limitations of using newspaper articles and public media as sources is that there is such a large volume of newspaper articles related to communist ideology during the Cold War and the Islamic ideology in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that it would be impossible to collect a complete set of information. Thus I will be using the New York Times, the Washington Post and TIME Magazine to collect newspaper articles. Furthermore, due to the extensive collection of newspaper articles, I will be looking at articles that were published during periods of American intervention against communist groups, specifically in Korea, Cuba and Vietnam as well as articles that were published immediately before and after September 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Also most American newspapers tend to have a tilted political stance. The articles released in the New York Times and TIME Magazine tend to be more liberal and promote the horrors of war, whereas the Washington Post will provide more conservative articles that generally support war. Consequently the bias of the newspaper itself must be taken into consideration when gathering information.
In addition to examining the ways in which the U.S. promotes the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to American and global security as a means for legitimizing foreign intervention, I also question whether or not the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is really a legitimate cause for intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq considering the relations between the U.S. and other Muslim countries – specifically Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In order to examine the relations between the U.S. and countries with populations that have a Muslim majority I will study both academic articles and newspaper articles to gather information on annual distributions of aid, whether or not the countries are members of NATO or are considered non-NATO allies, whether or not there are active Islamic extremist groups in the country and the measures taken by the local government in dismantling these groups. The limitations with studying relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries and the dynamics of Islamic extremist groups like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is that often times articles do not offer very conclusive or detailed information about these groups because they have a Western-bias. Since most of the articles will be American or Western-based articles, I will not be able to gather information regarding Muslim countries’ foreign policies with the United States or specific facts regarding Islamic fundamentalist groups’ perspective on the U.S. However it is my hope that through newspaper articles and academic articles I can gather enough information to show how the U.S. has sold the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to legitimize foreign intervention despite the fact that Islamic ideology is not in fact a big threat to the U.S. given its peaceful relations with other Muslim countries.
IV. Theory
During the Cold War, the United States intervened in countries with rising communist opposition groups on the grounds that these groups were linked to the expansionist Soviet Union and thus posed a threat to the American position in the global balance of power. In order to sell this communist threat and gain public support of such interventions, the U.S. filled newspapers and other forms of media with the need to resist all communist challenges to protect American security. Furthermore, the U.S. grew cautious of developing relations with countries highly influenced by communist groups, and planted intelligence groups or intervened in order to prevent the growth of these groups and consequently the spread of Communism. With the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has continued to use an ideological threat, this time based on Islamic fundamentalism, to legitimize and gain support for its international interventions. After the attacks of September 11 which launched the American-led global war on terror, the U.S. identified members of Al-Qaeda who were Muslim extremists as the biggest threat to American security because of the ideology they profess and the means they use to do it – terrorism. After examining newspapers and other forms of American media, I expect to find articles promoting this global war on terror and the fight against Islamic extremists as necessary to protect American security, which will be similar to the media released during the Cold War which endorsed the threat of Communism to American and global peace. With the invasion of Afghanistan shortly after the September 11 attacks, the U.S. used this propaganda to legitimize its use of military force directly against the terrorists involved in the attacks. After September 11, since the U.S. actually had suffered a foreign attack, most Americans felt a great sense of fear and a need for justice against Al-Qaeda, thus it was fairly easy for the United States to gain domestic and international support for the invasion of Afghanistan, yet American media still promoted this banner of a war on terror and the need to defend against Islamic extremism. Two years later with its invasion of Iraq, the U.S. again used the threat of Islamic extremism as one of the main reasons for foreign intervention. President Bush declared that the conflict in Iraq posed a threat to American security because Muslim extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were harbored in the country, therefore the U.S. needed to proactively dismantle these groups. While public support for the invasion of Iraq was not as substantial as public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, I still expect to find newspaper articles and other forms of media that support President Bush’s war on terror and promote the need to remove Islamic extremist groups through foreign intervention. I also expect to find that American media will still make references back to the horrors of September 11 as a way to persuade the American public of the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism and the need to combat Islamic extremists in Iraq.
Although the U.S. has continued its Cold War strategy – promoting the need to resist an ideological threat to protect national and global security – with its invasions of the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism may not be, in fact, as much of a domestic and global threat as Communism was because of friendly relations between the U.S. and countries with Muslim majorities. Thus I expect to find evidence of friendly relations, including heavy distributions of aid, partnerships through NATO and other non-NATO alliances and successful measures by these countries’ governments to limit the influence by Islamic fundamentalist groups. These countries all share populations with a Muslim majority and also all support the American-led war on terror. Even in Pakistan where Taliban and Al-Qaeda members are still present, the country is still receiving large amounts of aid from the United States. Thus if the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism really served as a threat to the United States, the U.S. would respond similar to how it did during the Cold War and insert intel groups into the areas or at least close off aid and friendly negotiations. Consequently, based on these expectations I conclude that since the U.S. has developed friendly relations with Muslim countries that have Islamic fundamentalist groups, the ideology does not pose as much of a threat as American media makes it seem, undermining its legitimacy as a cause for American intervention.
V. Analysis
The media released from the New York Times, the Washington Post and TIME Magazine throughout the Cold War all promoted the idea that Communism was a threat to American security and international peace and the U.S. had to actively face this threat. The day after the inauguration of President Truman in January of 1949 – as the conflict in Korea began to escalate – the headlines of the New York Times read “Truman, 32D President, is inaugurated; calls on U.S. to lead Democratic world; denounces Communism, Pledges U.N. aid.”[14] The article goes on to say that in Truman’s inauguration speech he made a sharp distinction between Democracy and Communism marking Communism as a threat to world recovery and lasting peace.[15] Similarly, the front-page headlines of the Washington Post on the day after Truman’s inauguration read, “Truman proposes ‘Fair Deal’ plan for world; challenge to Communism voiced at inaugural,” followed by an explanatory report on Truman’s ‘Fair Deal’ to challenge world communism.[16] Thus while Truman’s inauguration speech also focused on other points of national strategy, newspapers chose to highlight the threat that Communism posed to both the U.S. and the world along with the role of the U.S. in combating such a threat.
Newspapers also looked to emphasize the threat of Communism during periods of increased American intervention. On June 28, 1950, the day after President Truman sent American forces to help South Korea, the front-page story of the New York Times stated “President takes chief role in determining U.S. course” by ordering American air and navy units to fight in aid of Korea in order to resist further communist aggression.[17] Thus according to the newspaper, increased military aid in Korea is justified by the need to counter communist forces and consequently the American public is made to think that Communism actually is a threat to American and global security and needs to be challenged by the U.S. through means including military intervention. President Truman continued this idea in his State of the Union address in January of 1952, explaining that the U.S. had been successful in holding communists back in Korea but Communism still threatens the security of East Asia.[18] TIME Magazine summarized Truman’s message saying “the U.S. must continue to stand fast against world Communism, with military power and with economic aid to friends in Europe and Asia.”[19] Even though President Truman also addressed domestic policy issues, TIME Magazine mainly targeted the American stance towards Communism as the focus of Truman’s message, as opposed to saying the fight against the forces in North Korea.
The promotion of the fight against Communism continued as Castro’s communist regime began to emerge in Cuba. After President Kennedy’s address to the U.S. on October 22, 1962 explaining the discovery of a missile-base build-up in Cuba, newspaper headlines from the Washington Post read, “Kennedy orders Cuba blockade as Reds build A-bases on island.”[20] The New York Times had similar captions including “Kennedy ready for Soviet showdown” and “Russians lied and put hemisphere in great danger.”[21] Thus both of these newspapers presented the Cuban Missile Crisis as an increase in communist power – by linking the construction of missile bases to the Reds or communists and by explaining that the western hemisphere is in danger because of the communist Russians. Consequently, Kennedy’s announcement of the U.S. blockade against Cuba is justified as a means to balance increasing communist aggression. The need for American intervention to battle Communism became even greater when communist forces grew in Vietnam. Headlines in the New York Times on June 20, 1964 said, “U.S. stressing it would fight to defend Asia – Warning to Reds.”[22] The article goes on to say that the U.S. administration has made it clear that if communist forces continue to expand into neighboring territories then the U.S. will intervene and is able to do so because U.S. commitment to the security of Southeast Asia is unlimited.[23] Thus the New York Times has clearly targeted the Red communists as a threat to the U.S. and world peace by constructing this idea that the U.S. is defending the world from a perceived enemy and in doing so has justified the need for American intervention. In looking at newspaper articles around periods of American intervention throughout the Cold War, it is clear that newspapers in general are very strategic in constructing certain images and ideas related to the threat of Communism within the minds of the American public. The New York Times, the Washington Post and TIME Magazine all focused on the fight against Communism, rather than the fight against specific opposition groups. Furthermore, in both newspaper articles and Presidential addresses, the idea that it is the role or responsibility of the U.S. to provide assistance to countries facing communist forces is presented to persuade public opinion that any means including military intervention is necessary to counter Communism. Now the question becomes are these media tactics still used in newspapers today to justify American intervention in the Middle East.
Table A summarizes my findings after examining media around the September 11 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. I have listed the newspaper used and the date the article was published along with whether or not the headlines of the paper included some reference to Islamic fundamentalism, which may also be Islamic extremism or jihadism, whether or not the headlines included a reference to terrorism and the frequency of the words Islamic fundamentalism or extremism within the front-page articles themselves.
| Newspaper | Date Published | Radical Islam reference in Headlines | Terror reference in Headlines | Terror reference in Article | Radical Islam reference in Article |
| Washington Post | September 12, 2010 | No | No | 5 | 5 |
| Washington Post | September 12, 2010 | No | Yes | 13 | 2 |
| Washington Post | September 12, 2010 | No | No | 11 | 6 |
| New York Times | September 12, 2010 | No | Yes | 6 | 2 |
| Washington Post | October 8, 2001 | No | No | 21 | 1 |
| New York Times | October 8, 2001 | No | Yes | 12 | 2 |
| Washington Post | March 18, 2003 | No | No | 5 | 0 |
| New York Times | March 20, 2003 | No | No | 12 | 0 |
Table A: Radical Islam and Terror References in Newspapers
Following the attacks of September 11, the U.S. immediately needed someone to blame for the so-called acts of war. As information began to emerge that members of Al-Qaeda were responsible for the terrorist attacks, newspapers quickly released information on Islamic fundamentalism and the danger it poses to both the U.S. and the rest of the world. On September 12, 2001, the Washington Post published an article which read, “The enemy has identified itself in public and openly…[i]ts name is radical Islam...a specific fringe political movement, dedicated to imposing its fanatical ideology on its own societies and destroying the society of its enemies, the greatest of which is the United States.”[24] Thus instead of only identifying Al-Qaeda as the group behind the attacks, the U.S. has targeted Islamic fundamentalism as an ideological threat most directly aimed at the U.S. Similar headlines from the New York Times on the day following the terrorist attacks included, “A somber Bush says Terrorism cannot prevail” and “President vows to exact punishment for evil.”[25] While the headlines did not mention Islamic Fundamentalism, the front page stories of the New York Times described Bin Laden as an “Islamic militant” linking him to this ideology as opposed to Al-Qaeda specifically.[26] The headlines of the Washington Post on September 12 also refrained from calling out Islamic fundamentalism and instead said, “Bush promises retribution” and “U.S. intelligence points to Bin Laden network.”[27] However Islamic extremism was cited frequently in front page stories, explaining that government officials “suspect the involvement of Islamic extremists” and also information had suggested “that Islamic fundamentalists [who] aligned with bin Laden were ‘almost certainly’ behind the attacks.”[28] Even though Islamic fundamentalism was not included in newspaper headlines, newspapers still labeled those behind the September 11 attacks as Islamic extremists, identifying the ideology as a whole rather than only the specific group, Al-Qaeda. As a result, the American public is now made to think that the September 11 attacks and consequently the American-led war on terror are strongly linked to Islamic fundamentalism. In President Bush’s address to the U.S. declaring this war on terror, he explains “the terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism…and its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden [is] linked to many other organizations in different countries.”[29] The U.S. has identified Islamic extremists all over the world as the primary target in this new war against terror and consequently has allowed the U.S. to persuade the American public to support any attempt to intervene in areas threatened by Islamic fundamentalists.
While newspapers looked to promote the threat of Islamic fundamentalists immediately after the September 11 attacks, once the plans for the invasion of Afghanistan came about, newspapers became more focused on combating terrorism and specific terrorist groups. On October 8, 2001, the day after American forces were sent into Afghanistan, the headlines of the Washington Post and the New York Times read, “U.S., Britain launch airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan” and “U.S. and Britain strike Afghanistan, aiming at bases and terrorist camps; Bush warns ‘Taliban will pay a price.’”[30],[31] Both papers included front page stories which specifically identified Al-Qaeda terrorist camps and the Taliban government as the primary targets for the invasion of Afghanistan and explain that the purpose of the invasion is to carry out the fight against the threat of terrorism and punish those states which support or harbor terrorists. Thus unlike newspaper articles published during periods of intervention in the Cold War which highlighted the threat of strengthened communist forces, these newspaper articles have targeted the specific groups that pose a threat to the U.S. and justify American intervention based on the need to dismantle Al-Qaeda and the Taliban rather than Islamic fundamentalism in general. However even though both newspapers have no mention of Islamic fundamentalism, the linkages made between Islamic extremism and terrorism in past newspaper articles and Presidential addresses suggest that the fight against terror in Afghanistan is also against the larger ideological threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Both newspapers also made many references to the September 11 attacks, justifying the invasion of Afghanistan as a need for retaliation against those responsible for the attacks, once again implying that the war in Afghanistan is targeting Islamic extremists.
The U.S. continued its war on terrorism with its plans to invade Iraq. Similar to the media released about the invasion of Afghanistan, newspaper articles and Presidential addresses once again used the threat of terrorism and specific groups rather than Islamic fundamentalism as a whole to legitimize its need for foreign intervention. Leading up to the invasion, President Bush explained in his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003 that terrorism was the biggest danger facing the U.S. and the world and consequently the U.S. has been “called to defend the safety of [its] people, and the hopes of all mankind. And [it has] accept[ed] this responsibility.”[32] Front-page newspaper articles leading up to the start of the war on Iraq also highlighted the American role in fighting terrorism. On March 20, 2003, the front page of the New York Times read “topping the Iraqi government was ‘a vital part’ of a broader war against terrorism” because of the fact that “Iraq harbors terrorists” and because intervention would “assist efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and capture terrorists around the globe.”[33] Both the New York Times and President Bush’s address emphasized the threat of terrorism and the role of the U.S. in fighting against this threat to persuade the American public of the need for foreign intervention, just as the U.S. did during the Cold War. The Washington Post also looked to promote the threat of terrorism but also made many references to the September 11 attacks in the articles leading up to the invasion of Iraq. On March 18, 2003, an article on the front page of the Washington Post explained that the responsibility “falls to the United States, as the world’s lone superpower, and whatever coalition the U.S. can muster, to remove Hussein and prevent another recurrence of the kind of terrorist attack that occurred on Sept. 11.”[34] By drawing ties between the attacks of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq, the media is able to bring about a sense of fear and anger within the American public which was felt after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. that might help persuade Americans to support the war effort. Similarly, given the links made between Islamic fundamentalism and the September 11 attacks, the American public may view the invasion of Iraq as another retaliatory measure against those responsible for the attacks or a way to deter future attacks. Thus in both the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, American media looked to promote the war on terror and the role of the U.S. in combating terrorism to legitimize its interventions in the Middle East. While the U.S. targeted terrorism instead of Islamic fundamentalism as I had hypothesized, there is still a connection between the two because of the media that was published after the September 11 attacks. The degree to which the war on terror is simply a war against Islamic extremists is difficult to measure, however given that newspaper articles and Presidential addresses immediately following the September 11 attacks identified Islamic fundamentalists as those behind the attacks instead of specific Islamic groups, I argue that the war on terror does suggest a fight against Islamic extremists.
My examination of friendly relations between countries with a Muslim majority – specifically Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – and the U.S. is still significant in demonstrating that Islamic fundamentalism is not actually as much of a threat as American media makes it seem because of the connection between terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. In the days after the attacks of September 11, the headlines of the New York Times and the Washington Post read “U.S. demands Arab countries ‘choose sides’” and “Bush tells Nations to take sides.”[35],[36] The U.S. had already targeted Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network in Afghanistan as those being behind the attacks, yet still forced other Arab countries with Muslim majorities to align themselves with either the U.S. or bin Laden, even though members of Islamic fundamentalist groups lived within the borders of some of these countries. In Table B I have summarized U.S. relations with Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey based on the following criteria: amount of aid – both military and economic – given by the U.S. to the country in 2002, the year immediately following the attacks of September 11; whether or not the country is a member of NATO; whether or not the country is a declared non-NATO ally and year of declaration; whether or not there are active Islamic extremist groups within the country; and how effectively the government has combated these groups.
| Country | Aid in 2002[37] | NATO | Non-NATO Ally | Active Islamic extremist Groups | Government active in combating Groups |
| Pakistan | $2.5 million | No | Yes (2004) | Yes | Very effective |
| Egypt | $1.9 billion | No | Yes (1989) | Yes | Very effective |
| Saudi Arabia | $10 million | No | No | Yes | Not very effective |
| Turkey | $10 million | Yes | NATO ally | Yes | Very effective |
Table B: U.S. Relations with Muslim Countries
Aid as a determinant in friendly relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries is significant because it is difficult to enforce how the aid is distributed in the receiving country. In countries with Islamic extremist groups, there is the possibility that foreign aid could be distributed from the government to these groups. It is also possible that aid may have a negative correlation with friendly relations and instead may be used to manipulate countries into behaving in a certain way. TIME Magazine published an article which looked to examine the threat level of terrorist networks in certain countries calling Pakistan a “den of terror” and “an actual terrorist sanctuary” in which “Al-Qaeda is thriving.”[38] However despite the presence of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, President Bush still announced in November of 2001 that “the United States was providing an aid package worth more than $1 billion to Pakistan in exchange for Pakistan’s support of the war in Afghanistan.”[39] Whether or not aid may be interpreted as a bribe to Muslim governments, given the significant amount of aid distributed by the U.S. to these countries, especially Egypt, there is an obvious level of cooperation.
Turkey is the only listed country which is a NATO ally, however Pakistan and Egypt are also non-NATO allies. This distinction as a non-NATO ally is a significant determinant in measuring friendly relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries. When the U.S. declared Pakistan as a non-NATO ally in 2004, the two countries’ Presidents “reaffirmed their shared commitment to a broad and lasting strategic partnership, agreeing to continue their cooperation on a number of issues including: counterterrorism efforts, security in the region, strengthening democratic institutions” and other goals.[40] However the U.S. has labeled these countries as allies despite the fact that they all have active Islamic extremist groups within their borders. Yet more importantly than the presence of Islamic fundamentalist groups is the way in which the local governments deal with these groups. Official U.S. documents have explained that “since September 2001, Pakistan has provided extensive assistance in counterterrorism efforts by capturing more than 600 al-Qa[e]da members and their allies.”[41] Egypt and Turkey have also both been the targets of terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalist groups leading them to take serious measures against Islamic fundamentalist groups, for example Egypt has made the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization and furthermore has prohibited the formation of political parties based on religion.[42] Saudi government, on the other hand, has not been as effective in breaking apart Islamic fundamentalist groups. In an article published by the Washington Post, U.S. officials have explained that “most terrorist money still originates in Saudi Arabia,” leading to American demands on the Saudi government to put pressure on Saudi financiers.[43] However, in May 2003, Saudi Arabia also faced a series of terrorist attacks by an organization directly linked to Al-Qaeda making the country another target by these Islamic extremist groups.
Based on these conclusions as revealed in Table B, given the significant amounts of aid, the status of these Muslim countries as allies with the U.S. and the measures taken by local governments in dismantling these groups, the U.S. has developed strong relations with these Muslim countries that still do have Islamic fundamentalist groups within their borders. During the Cold War, the U.S. was cautious to develop strong relations with countries that had uprising communist forces and looked to intervene in these countries. In more recent times, the U.S. has only intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq as a response to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. However if Islamic fundamentalism really was a threat, the U.S. perhaps should have looked to intervene in other countries where there are active Islamic extremist groups such as Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Turkey, yet as we have seen the U.S. has developed friendly relations with these countries instead of sending substantial military forces directly into these areas. Consequently, using the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq may have been a misleading ploy by the American media considering that the U.S. has created strong relations with other Muslim countries in which there are active Islamic fundamentalist groups.
VI. Conclusion
The media during periods of American intervention throughout the Cold War all emphasized the threat of Communism and legitimized American intervention by constructing the idea that the role of the U.S. was to protect the rest of the world from this common enemy. Newspaper headlines and Presidential speeches referred to opposition groups as “Communist” and “Reds” and promoted the dangers that these groups pose to the U.S. and the rest of the world. After the attacks against the U.S. on September 11, American media once again pointed to an ideological threat of Islamic fundamentalism as being the cause of the terrorist acts. While this term was not publicized in newspaper headlines, front-page stories and public addresses made by President Bush linked the attacks to Islamic extremism rather than to the specific groups or people responsible for the attacks. As a result, the American public began to fear this ideology which had just surfaced in the U.S. in the form of terrorist attacks creating an unmistakable link between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Leading up to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the media shifted its focus from Islamic fundamentalism to terrorism, basing the intervention of American forces on the need to combat terrorism. However this paper argues that because of the connections made between terrorism and Islamic extremism immediately after the September 11 attacks, the American-led war on terror has been framed to include the fight against Islamic fundamentalism. Further studies on the linkages in the media between terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism may help strengthen the findings of this paper. Such studies might include a deeper analysis of newspaper articles or other forms of American media to determine the relationship between terrorism and Islamic extremism. Other studies might also look at specific Islamic fundamentalist groups and the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks by these groups to evaluate the level of terrorism within such groups. However in my examination of relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries, American newspapers and other articles seemed to use terrorist groups and Islamic fundamentalist groups interchangeably suggesting that the U.S. seems to overlook links made between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in its relations with these countries. If terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism really was a threat to the U.S. and world peace, the U.S. would have targeted Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in its war against terror rather than provide billions of dollars worth of aid in exchange for their support. In order to improve this claim, however, other studies may look to measure the level of control or influence that Islamic fundamentalist groups have in these countries to determine whether or not American intervention to dismantle these groups is necessary.
[1] James Kurth, “Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005,” Orbis 49:4 (2005), 632-633.
[2] Kurth, “Global Threats,” 644-645.
[3] Paul Paolucci, “Public Discourse in an Age of Deception: Forging the Iraq War,” Critical Sociology 35:6 (2009), 872-874.
[4] Paolucci, “Public Discourse in an Age of Deception,” 871.
[5] Kenneth R. Weinstein, “US Strategy in the Middle East and the 2004 Presidential Election 9/11: Towards a Redefinition of America’s Role in the World,” Asia-Pacific Review 11:2 (2004), 82.
[6] Weinstein, “US Strategy in the Middle East,” 83.
[7] Christopher Hobson, “A forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East: US democracy promotion and the ‘war on terror’,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59:1 (2005), 50.
[8] Hobson, “A forward strategy of freedom,” 49.
[9] George Leaman, “Iraq, American Empire and the War on Terrorism,” Metaphilosophy 35:3 (2004), 240.
[10] Leaman, “Iraq, American Empire and the War on Terrorism,” 242.
[11] Juan Cole, “Combating Muslim Extremism,” The Nation 285:16 (2007), 26.
[12] Cole, “Combating Muslim Extremism,” 26-27.
[14] Anthony Leviero, “Peace a Major Aim,” New York Times, January 21, 1949, A1.
[15] Leviero, “Peace a Major Aim,” A1.
[16] Edward T. Folliard, “Dazzling Sun Glorifies Day as Chief Executive Rides in Triumph,” Washington Post, January 21, 1949, A1.
[17] Arthur Krock, “President Takes Chief Role in Determining U.S. Course,” New York Times, June 28, 1950, A1.
[18] TIME Magazine, “The Nation: State of the Union,” January 21, 1952, 1.
[19] TIME Magazine, “The Nation: State of the Union,” 1.
[20] Washington Post, “Kennedy Orders Cuba Blockade as Reds Build A-Bases on Island,” October 23, 1962, A1.
[21] Anthony Lewis, “President Grave,” New York Times, October 23, 1962, A1.
[22] Max Frankel, “Warning To Reds,” New York Times, June 20, 1964, A1.
[23] Frankel, “Warning To Reds,” A1.
[24] Charles Krauthammer, “To War, Not to Court,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001, A29.
[25] Serge Schmemann, “U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for ‘Evil’,” New York Times, September 12, 2001, A1.
[26] Schmemann, “U.S. Attacked,” A1.
[27] Michael Grunwald, “Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001, A1.
[28] Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001, A1.
[29] Washington Post, “Transcript of President Bush’s Address,” September 21, 2001, A24.
[30] Dan Balz, “U.S., Britain Launch Airstrikes Against Targets in Afghanistan; ‘We Will Not Falter. And We Will Not Fail,’ Bush Pledges,” Washington Post, October 8, 2001, A1.
[31] Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns ‘Taliban Will Pay a Price’,” New York Times, October 8, 2001, A1.
[32] George W. Bush, “State of the Union,” Vital Speeches of the Day 69:6 (2003), 262.
[33] David E. Sanger and John F. Burns, “Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein,” New York Times, March 20, 2003, A1.
[34] Dan Balz, “Problems Abound, but Bush Stays Confident,” Washington Post, March 18, 2003, A1.
[35] Elisabeth Bumiller, “All Must Join Fight Against Terror, Bush Tells U.N.,” New York Times, November 11, 2001, A1.
[36] John F. Harris and Mike Allen, “President Details Global War on Terrorists and Supporters; Bush Tells Nations to Take Sides as N.Y. Toll Climbs Past 6,000,” Washington Post, September 21, 2001, A1.
[37] Federation of American Scientists, “Arms Sales Monitor,” Arms Sales Monitoring Project 47 (2002), 4.
[38] Tim McGirk, “Will They Strike Again?” TIME Magazine, December 2, 2002, 1.
[39] Bumiller, “All Must Join Fight Against Terror,” A1.
[40] United States Department of State, “Background Note: Pakistan,” Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (2010), accessed December 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm.
[41] United States Department of State, “Background Note: Pakistan.”
[42] United States Department of State, “Background Note: Egypt,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (2010), accessed December 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm.
[43] Douglas Farah, “Saudis Face U.S. Demands on Terrorism; Halting Financiers May Be Urged,” Washington Post, November 26, 2001, A1.
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